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Social Critique and Engagement between Universalism, 
Anti-Authoritarianism and Diagnosis of Domination
Abstract   The paper discusses a particular ‘isomorphy’ between two forms of 
social criticism: the ‘holistic’ theoretical social critique represented by such authors 
as Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth and ‘collective social engagement’ rep-
resented by such civic movements as the ‘We Won’t Let Belgrade D(r)own’ initiative 
in contemporary Serbia, which the paper tries to distinguish from more conven-
tional forms of popular protest. This ‘isomorphy’, the paper argues, consists in a 
tension between three distinct imperatives of the justification of critique – those 
of normative universalism, epistemological anti-authoritarianism, and diagnosis 
of social domination – produced by the attempts of both the ‘holistic’ social 
critics and the collectively engaged actors to simultaneously respond to all three 
imperatives. After presenting the three types of theoretical critique that crystallize 
around each imperative, the paper discusses the internal tension that arises in the 
works of ‘holistic’ theoretical critics and then identifies the same kind of tension 
in the ‘We Won’t Let Belgrade D(r)own’ initiative. The tension in the movement’s 
critique is outlined through a brief analysis of the activists’ discourse as articu-
lated in the bulletin We Won’t Let Belgrade D(r)own issued in March 2015. Since 
the examples also suggest that collective engagement is better than theoretical 
critique at keeping this tension ‘productive’, the paper finally offers some tentative 
thoughts on the possible reasons for this difference.
Keywords: isomorphy, tension, critique, justification, engagement, universalism, 
contextualism, diagnosis, Serbia
Introduction
This paper tries to identify and outline a particular ‘isomorphy’ between 
contemporary theoretical attempts at articulating a ‘holistic’ social critique, 
on the one hand, and contemporary forms of civic protest that I term ‘col-
lective social engagement’ on the other. Both, I argue, are characterized by 
a tension that is created through an attempt to simultaneously respond to 
three principal imperatives of the justification of critique: those of normative 
universalism, anti-authoritarianism and societal diagnosis, which I briefly 
explain below. This tension can only be resolved by focusing on satisfying, 
as completely as possible, one of the three imperatives at the cost of the 
other two, and most types of theoretical social critique resort to this strat-
egy. One exception are the ‘holistic’ social critics such as Jürgen Habermas 
and Axel Honneth who persist in simultaneously pursuing and interweav-
ing the goals of normative universalism, anti-authoritarianism and a diag-
nosis of contemporary forms of injustice and domination. Theoretical critique 
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with a ‘holistic’ ambition, I argue, has difficulties maintaining an equilibrium 
between the three imperatives of justification, as they pull the theorist in 
mutually diverging directions. The temptation to reduce the complexity of 
critique by focusing on only one or two of the imperatives is present even in 
Habermas and Honneth, but such reductive inclinations make their perspec-
tives either more normatively particularistic and ultimately unjustifiable 
(if they abandon universalism or anti-authoritarianism) or insensitive to 
actual societal problems (if they abandon the diagnostic task).
As I will try to show on the example of one prominent contemporary civic 
movement in Serbia – the initiative ‘We Won’t Let Belgrade D(r)own’ (‘Ne 
da[vi]mo Beograd’) – the form of political action that I term ‘collective 
social engagement’ is characterized by the same kind of internal tension, 
as the actors involved in the movement simultaneously use the language 
of universalism, anti-authoritarianism and societal diagnosis. In the case 
of engagement as opposed to theoretical critique, the tension arises from 
the engaged actors’ primary aim of transforming the ‘cause’ of their en-
gagement, a phenomenon that had hitherto been considered non-political, 
into a political issue. To achieve this complex task, mobilizing only one 
vocabulary of critique – universalism, contextualism or diagnosis – would 
be insufficient.
The tension at the core of theoretical social critique
There are three main contemporary imperatives of the justification of nor-
mative claims raised in theoretical social critique: those of normative uni-
versalism (the claim to a trans-contextual validity of normative statements), 
epistemological anti-authoritarianism (‘epistemic humility’ that gives up on 
‘transcending’ a particular socio-historical context) and the imperative of 
the diagnosis of real-world social injustices and domination that are often 
left completely unaddressed by abstract, ‘free-floating’ universalist theories 
of justice or contextualist forms of critique. One can identify these impera-
tives as fundamental due to the fact that most contemporary forms of 
theoretical critique crystallize around either one of them. Contemporary 
varieties of theoretical critique can therefore be divided into three very 
broad categories, by no means internally homogeneous and characterized 
by significant overlaps:
1. The universalist (proceduralist) type, which is characterized by a deon-
tological approach to the grounding of critique that safeguards the univer-
sal validity of its normative claims. Universalist perspectives most often 
asume the form of a purely proceduralist (or formal) deontological politi-
cal theory or theory of justice that provides the normative standard of 
criticism in all particular socio-historical contexts. For example, the majority 
of the contemporary ‘third-generation’ critical theorists such as Seyla Benhabib, 
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Maeve Cooke, Rainer Forst, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato have focused on 
elaborating the political-theoretic dimension of Habermasian critical theory 
while the social-theoretical side of Habermas’ project has largely slid into 
the background (e.g. Benhabib 2004; Forst 2002, 2003; Cohen 2012; Cohen 
and Arato 1994). The reason, I would argue, should be looked for in a 
contemporary distrust of social theory as epistemologically ‘authoritarian’ 
due to its predominantly positivist orientation (Cooke 2006). Universalist 
theoretical critique generally avoids or treats as illegitimate the question 
of diagnosing societal problems in the form of the causal (structural) ex-
planations of social injustices and forms of domination, and also avoids 
grounding critique in an explicit social ontology or a theory of the subject. 
Instead of tracing the causal mechanisms behind forms of social injustice, 
proceduralist theorists usually rely on mere empirical descriptions of in-
stances of injustice and then apply univeralist norms of critique to them.
2. The contextualist variety (Michael Walzer, Richard Rorty, Luc Boltanski), 
the type of social critique that focuses on satisfying the normative impera-
tive of epistemological anti-authoritarianism, brings together diverse currents 
across disciplinary boundaries such as pragmatism, communitarianism in 
political philosophy and Luc Boltanski’s ‘sociology of critique’. What the 
contextualists have in common is the (more or less explicit) treatment of 
forms of critique that aspire either to normative universalism or the ‘diag-
nosis’ of societal maladies as epistemologically authoritarian. The universal-
ist theorist of justice and the radical ‘diagnostic’ both require that we, ‘or-
dinary actors’, endorse their normative perspective on reality as the only 
right (or ‘true’) one. As they reject this authoritarian position, contextual-
ists also share another fundamental premise in grounding critique: they 
mostly relegate the task of critique to the ‘actors themselves’. They either 
rely on the existing (institutionalized or informal) norms in a given socio-
historical context and try to apply them in a more systematic manner, or 
they try to ‘reconstruct’ ordinary actors’ perspectives in the form of a coherent 
system. In any case, they refrain from substantive normative speculation and 
locate the criteria of critique in the empirically existing (and theoretically 
reconstructed) discourses of justification and political contestation (Bol-
tanski, 2011; Walzer, 1983; Rorty, 1989).
This is the only type of critique that satisfies the ‘strong’ conception of post-
metaphysical thought as articulated in Richard Rorty’s works, which requires 
that social critique be fully nominalist, that it fully acknowledge the con-
tingency of history and abandon any form of historical teleology (e.g. Jürgen 
Habermas’ ‘rationalization of the lifeworld’); and that the normative grounds 
of critique be free of any substantive ontological speculation (a theory of the 
subject, a social ontology, or any ’trans-contextual’ characteristics of social 
reality in general) (see Rorty, 1989; see also Prodanović in this volume).
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3. The diagnostic critique (contemporary neo-Marxism, critique inspired by 
the works of Michel Foucault, by Lacanian or Freudian psychonalysis, etc.): 
this approach to social critique, in contrast to the previous two, is based 
on a high degree of speculation regarding the nature of the human subject 
and the ontology of the social (even though much of it is devoted to ‘de-
constructing’ the conventional notions of subjectivity and social action). 
The approach tends to focus on the ‘deep-lying’ dynamics of social domina-
tion operating at the level of human subjectivation (the socially conditioned 
self-formation) and is therefore very effective in conceptualizing what one 
could term ‘structural domination’ (e.g. Butler, Laclau and Žižek, 2000). 
Also unlike the previous two types, this form of critique mostly follows the 
strategy of quietly ignoring the issues of epistemological authoritarianism 
and universal normative validity, and prefers instead to go ‘straight to the 
matter’, to the pressing issues of injustice and domination in the real world. 
In spite of their emancipatory intent, diagnostic standpoints can be very 
authoritarian towards what Richard Rorty calls the ‘final vocabularies’ of 
ordinary social actors (Rorty, 1989). In the language of critical theory, 
‘diagnosticians’ often reduce the ‘empirically effective’ normativity of social 
action – the normative claims of ordinary actors – to epiphenomenal effects 
of structural power. Diagnostic perspectives are sometimes underpinned by 
very counter-intuitive normative foundations, such as the psychoanalytic 
theories of the subject and corresponding social ontologies. Within this type 
of social critique the entire social reality often appears as fundamentally 
and intrinsically ‘domination-producing’, and any universalist or contex-
tualist perspective which tries to envision a transformation of social reality in 
the more conventional, ‘Enlightenment’ sense of the term looks irredeemably 
‘naive’ and ‘superficial’1.
Each of the three outlined types of theoretical social critique is particularly 
good at satisfying one of the imperatives of justification. The proceduralist 
type produces ever more complex and nuanced attempts at articulating a 
universalist theory of justice; the contextualist variety manages quite suc-
cessfully to ground critique in a fully post-metaphysical epistemology (nom-
inalism) and a ’non-authoritarian’ view on the role of the theorist (e.g. the 
‘situated critic’ of Michael Walzer’s perspective); and the diagnostic current 
displays a particularly acute understanding of ‘structural domination’ in 
various social orders, i.e. how the relations of power permeate the process 
1  Maeve Cooke reaches a similar conclusion in her critique of Hardt’s and Negri’s Empire: 
‘the immanence of power dissemination and perpetuation means that political change 
will be insufficient: even a radical democratization of the market – for instance, one that 
encompasses redistribution of wealth, reorganizing of work practices, and redressing of 
imbalances in social status – will fail to remedy its dominating effects. So long as social 
domination is stamped on the brains and bodies of subjectivities and reproduced by their 
ways of being in the world, democratization is futile’ (Cooke, 2006: 193).
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of subject-formation in different socio-economic formations. However, as 
a result of this crystallization around one of the three imperatives of justi-
fication, each of the three varieties gives up on at least one crucial task of 
social critique. The proceduralist variety gives up on articulating a diagnosis 
of social domination grounded in explanatory propositions about social reality 
(social theory); the contextualist one on securing the foundations of critique 
which would be somewhat more independent of the fluctuations in the 
normative self-understanding of a given political community; and the di-
agnostic one, in contrast, gives up on articulating a more ‘non-authoritarian’ 
basis of critique that would resonate to a greater degree with the self-un-
derstanding of ‘ordinary’ social actors.
‘Holistic’ social critique: Habermas and Honneth
As mentioned earlier, one exception to the increasing crystallization of 
forms of theoretical social critique around one or the other of the three 
imperatives of justification is the ‘intersubjectivist’ strand within contem-
porary critical theory represented by authors such as Jürgen Habermas and 
Axel Honneth. Jürgen Habermas’ social critique, most systematically ar-
ticulated in his two-volume The Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas, 
1984, 1987) can, for example, be seen as an attempt to simultaneously 
satisfy all three imperatives of justification within a holistic type of critique. 
Habermas attempts to formulate a normatively universalist foundation of 
critique (discourse ethics) that is at the same time grounded in the perspec-
tives of ordinary social actors (everyday speech situations) and that also 
has a diagnostic intent: Habermas diagnoses forms of social domination 
(e.g. the concept of the ‘systemic colonization of the lifeworld’) on the 
grounds of a social-theoretical concept of ‘communicative reason’. More 
generally, Habermas conceptualizes social domination as all forms of the 
‘systematic distortion’ of rational communication by power and by the 
imperatives of material social reproduction (Habermas, 1984, 1987).
However, the perspective from which Habermas theorizes social domina-
tion, I would argue, is rather narrow and removed from the self-under-
standing of ‘ordinary’ social actors, particularly those engaged in political 
action informed by progressive normative claims (feminist, ecological, 
minority-rights movements, etc.). As Habermas’ conception of domination 
is rooted in his broader theorization of the ‘social’, it has rather little sen-
sitivity for an entire dimension of social dynamic which we could define, 
in the spirit of Pierre Bourdieu’s work, as the ‘symbolic struggle’ between 
social groups for the realization of their normative worldviews within 
modern institutional complexes. Due to Habermas’ strong philosophical 
‘anti-essentialism’, his theoretical diagnosis of social domination is, in my 
view, very restricted and ignores a whole range of theoretical concerns 
which motivated the first-generation critical theorists such as ‘commodity 
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fetishism’, ‘culture industry’, the ‘repression of drives’, ‘identity thinking’ or 
the progressive expansion of ‘instrumental reason’ (e.g. Adorno, 1981, 
2001; Marcuse, 1974, 1991). Habermas’ strong orientation towards norma-
tive universalism ultimately results in the marginalization of the diagnostic 
task. As Christopher Zurn, for example, asks:
what had become of the great critical areas of interest of the past: the 
phenomenal changes in cultural life through the industrialized mass me-
dia and new communications technology, the transformations of person-
ality structures, the nature and role of ideology in the maintenance of 
structures of domination and oppression? What had become of the leading 
social concepts imbued with emancipatory content: alienation, anomie, 
commodification, reification ... and so on (Zurn, 2010: 9)?
The work of Axel Honneth, a leading figure in the ‘third-generation’ critical 
theory, tries to reintroduce some of these concerns into the Habermasian 
type of social critique. One of the central aims of Honneth’s work has been 
to shift the social-theoretical ‘optic’ of Habermasian critical theory towards 
the earlier mentioned dimension of social reality neglected by Habermas 
– the fundamental conflict over the normative frameworks of social action 
– and to develop the corresponding ‘conflict-theoretic’ accounts of social 
integration and change. Honneth’s project of developing a social-philosophical 
critical theory (Honneth, 2009) is motivated by two key ambitions. On the 
one hand, the early Honneth’s works were underpinned by a conviction 
that critical theory has lost some of its Marxist ‘edge’ with Habermas’ lin-
guistic turn, and Honneth therefore envisaged his own project as that of 
formulating the missing critique of capitalism and a theorization of class 
conflict within the confines of Habermas’ intersubjectivist paradigm (Honneth, 
1991)2. This diagnostic task, however, required Honneth to return to a 
normatively more substantive approach to social critique than Habermas’ 
abstract discourse ethics, one that would have something to say, for example, 
about the political struggles against the economic injustices of today. On 
the other hand, Honneth has had little doubt that Habermas has greatly 
enhanced both the normative universalism and the epistemological anti-
authoritarianism of critical theory with the linguistic turn. The second main 
task that Honneth had set himself can thus be understood as the further 
enhancement of Habermasian critical theory along the lines of normative 
univesalism and contextualist anti-authoritarianism.
It is precisely this (overly) ambitious project of a simultaneous radicalization 
of critique and a further refinement of critical theory’s normative foundations 
2  As Deranty points out in Beyond Communication, ’the complexity of this relationship 
[Honneth’s to Habermas], stems from the fact that the many critical objections brought 
against Habermas are themselves inspired by Honneth’s early Neo-Marxist position’ 
(Deranty, 2009: 11).
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which makes Honneth’s theory internally conflicted and vulnerable to an 
array of criticisms (see Alexander and Pia Lara, 1996; Deranty, 2010, 2009; 
Ivković, 2014). In his attempt to rearticulate Habermasian critical theory 
in all three dimensions, Honneth has ultimately made a somewhat contro-
versial move. He has largely abandoned Habermas’ normative ‘formalism’ 
(the proceduralism which characterizes discourse ethics), the core of the 
latter’s post-metaphysical perspective, and has introduced instead a nor-
matively substantive foundation of critique in the form of the ‘universal 
preconditions of human self-formation’ (Honneth, 1996). In Honneth’s 
perspective, these preconditions consist in three distinct forms of intersub-
jective recognition: love, respect, and esteem. The concept of the three 
varieties of recognition at the same time provides the basis for the diagnos-
tic aspect of Honneth’s critique (various ‘pathologies’ of intersubjective 
recognition) and allows Honneth to make a ‘contextualist’ argument that 
his own grounds of critique in the form of social actors’ normative ‘claims 
to recognition’ are merely reconstructions of these actors’ everyday experi-
ences (Honneth, 1996).
Just as the tension between the three imperatives of justification induced 
Habermas to severely restrict the diagnostic aspect of his work to safeguard 
the first two (universalist and contextualist), the same tension in Hon-
neth’s project seems to have resulted in a marginalization of the pursuit 
of universalism.
Collective social engagement 
as a particular type of political action
The above discussed tension at the core of ‘holistic’ social critique such as 
Habermas’ and Honneth’s mirrors the one that exists in certain forms of 
contemporary political action which could be termed ‘collective social 
engagement’. However, unlike the realm of theoretical critique where, as 
I tried to show on Habermas’ and Honneth’s examples, the tension has so 
far proven paralyzing to some extent (as it has induced both of them to 
marginalize the pursuit of one of the imperatives), collective social engage-
ment has a greater potential to keep this tension a ‘productive’ one.
Let me first clarify how I conceptualize ‘collective social engagement’ against 
the background of the broader notion of ‘popular protest’. While conven-
tional popular protest has a cause within the sphere of institutional politics, 
collective engagement is the type of political action that takes place (at 
least in its initial phases) outside this sphere, as it arises from certain social 
actors’ ‘experience of injustice’ in everyday life, and its first phase is the 
collective articulation of this experience that constitutes the given group 
of actors as the ‘agent’ of engagement. While conventional protest move-
ments rally around a cause that is already perceived as political by the 
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general public (e.g. electoral fraud, legal discrimination of a minority), 
the most important trait of engagement is the engaged actors’ aim to 
‘politicize’ a certain concrete issue that would otherwise not be considered 
political (contested) by the general public.3 ‘Political’ in this sense means 
above all normatively contested: a certain occurrence, phenomenon or 
course of action becomes ‘political’ once there are two or more opposing 
normative perspectives on it in the public sphere (see also Zaharijević in 
this volume). The engaged actors have the aim of generalizing the norma-
tive contest that first arises in relation to a concrete experience of injustice. 
Ultimately, the engaged actors most often also aim to ‘institutionalize’ their 
standpoint, which means that their standpoint should be included in the 
legal framework that regulates the state’s action with respect to the object 
of their engagement.
The crucial difference between collective engagement and conventional 
protest lies in the constitution (articulation) of the movement’s cause: in a 
classical political protest, the cause is ‘always already’ political (contested 
in the public) at the initial point of the experience of injustice. In collective 
social engagement the experience of injustice pertains to a cause that is 
not-yet-political, and it is the successful articulation of that experience that 
transforms the ‘special interest’ of a particular group into a matter of gen-
eral concern. The ‘politicization’ of the cause, as I argued in the introduction, 
requires the simultaneous pursuit of three different strategies of justifying 
critique that correspond to the three normative imperatives. Below I analyze 
briefly the case of one prominent instance of collective social engagement 
in contemporary Serbia – the ‘We Won’t Let Belgrade D(r)own’ initiative 
– in order to point out the tension between the three distinct ‘vocabularies’ 
of critique employed by the movement that is ‘isomorphic’ with the one we 
found in the realm of theory. However, when looking at the concrete ex-
amples of the three vocabularies, one also observes that they can much 
more easily be ‘interwoven’ and kept in a state of ‘productive tension’ than 
in theoretical social critique. In the concluding section I will briefly discuss 
the reasons for this greater ‘productivity’ of tension in collective engage-
ment as opposed to theory.
‘We Won’t Let Belgrade D(r)own’ Initiative: 
politicization through a ‘holistic’ vocabulary of critique
In the 2012 election campaign in Serbia, the Serbian Progressive Party 
introduced for the first time the idea of a large-scale project of urban 
renovation in downtown Belgrade entitled ‘Belgrade Waterfront’ (‘Beograd 
3  Saying that a given phenomenon is not (yet) contested in public does not necessarily 
imply that the public sees it as justified; it is sufficient that there is a lack of a perceivable 
normative contest (a public debate) in relation to it. 
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na vodi’).4 Sometime upon coming to power, the Progressive Party decided 
to realize the project, now declared to be of ‘national significance’, and 
found a partner in a private company ‘Eagle Hills’ from United Arab 
Emirates. The project required that the Serbian state lease around 100 
acres of land along the river Sava in downtown Belgrade to the private 
investor (Eagle Hills), who would build around 200 objects for commercial 
and residential purposes on this plot of land. At the time the project was 
presented to the public, the company’s prospective investment was supposed 
to be worth around 3,5 billion euros, but the exact figure that later appeared 
in the contract proved to be much lower: 150 million. As specified by the 
contract, the Serbian state is obliged to infrastructurally prepare the whole 
terrain for building at a huge cost, while the investor will enjoy extra-
territorial rights on this part of sovereign Serbian territory over a period of 
30 years, which is the envisaged period for completing the whole urban 
development plan.
Although a large section of the expert public in Serbia (architects, urban 
planners, engineers, legal scholars, etc.) immediately criticized the project, 
the broader public was mostly silent on the issue and the climate seemed 
to be one of a general acceptance of the project as justified and politically 
uncontroversial. The scope of this paper prevents an independent discussion 
of the project, but suffice it to say that the project has since its very inception 
fitted into the broader neoliberal agenda of the Serbian Progressive Party 
government led by Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić. This agenda of an 
accelerated socio-economic transformation of Serbia into a peripheral 
capitalist state includes the reshaping of downtown Belgrade into a gentri-
fied, increasingly gated island of economic prosperity surrounded by the 
rest of the country in the form of an impoverished recruitment pool of low-
wage labor for local economic elites and global capital. Similar projects of 
large-scale ‘urban renewal’ which serve the (overlapping) interests of global 
capital and local political and economic elites exist throughout the world 
and could be seen as part of a global trend of ‘neoliberalization’. Moreover, 
it remains unclear whether the project will at all be realized to any significant 
degree, or whether it was from the outset conceived largely as a propa-
ganda device or a money laundering scheme. The official contract between 
the Serbian government and the private investor was signed on 26. April 
2015, became accessible to the public on 20. September, and the initial 
stages of the project’s realization began in the immediate aftermath.
In October 2014, soon after the Serbian government’s announcement of 
the ‘Plan for the Special Purpose Area’ which presented the stages of the 
project’s realization over a period of 30 years, the citizens’ initiative ‘We 
4  The Serbian title of the project would literally translate as ‘Belgrade on Water’ – this 
is why the Initiative against it uses the metaphor of ‘drowning’ Belgrade in its name.
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Won’t Let Belgrade D(r)own’ was founded and immediately presented a 
list of thorough and professionally competent objections to the Plan. The 
most active members of the initiative, which soon gained a considerable 
following, have engaged in various forms of civic activism, organizing 
protests when crucial official documents related to the project were being 
signed, holding public debates, attending the meetings of the relevant 
government bodies open to the public, starting a website and Facebook 
page and issuing a bulletin with detailed analyses and criticisms of the 
project. As stated on its website, the initiative considers the ‘Belgrade Water-
front’ project to be ‘catastrophic for Belgrade and Serbia from an economic, 
transportation and urban development aspects’, and maintains that it ‘in 
no way constitutes a project of national significance’ (‘Ne da(vi)mo Beograd’, 
internet)5. In defining the movement, members of the initiative state that
the initiative ‘We Won’t Let Belgrade D(r)own’ was created because it is 
opposed to the project ‘Belgrade Waterfront’, its objectives, consequences 
and the way the whole process of ‘planning’ and the legalization of the 
project takes place. Through its activities, the initiative has brought 
together - and continues to bring - a large number of experts, associations, 
NGOs, collectives, lawyers, academics, journalists, architects, urban plan-
ners, with the idea to stress the importance of citizen participation in 
issues of urban development, both in terms of the project ‘Belgrade Wa-
terfront’ and on the broader front of the city’s development as a whole. 
The ambition of the initiative is to expand to the greatest possible degree 
the public awareness of where and how we want to live (‘Ne da(vi)mo 
Beograd’, internet).
The initiative is clearly an instance of ‘collective social engagement’ as defined 
above, and can be situated within the broader ‘right to the city’ type of 
political protest (similar initiatives exist in the region and across the world, 
for example in Zagreb and Dubrovnik in Croatia, but also in Hamburg, in 
South Africa, in the United States as the ‘Right to the City Alliance’, etc.). 
The aim of the movement is the re-articulation of an issue that the Serbian 
government wishes to present as a non-ideological, ‘technocratic’ and ‘de-
velopmental’ matter (as ‘progress’ pure and simple) into a political one – an 
issue that includes questions of justice, public welfare, arbitrary exercise of 
power, transparency, economic exploitation and many others. For this pur-
pose, the movement uses the language of normative universalism, criticizing 
the project as unjust due to the fact that it is detrimental to public welfare 
and serves the interest of the ruling political and economic elites.
Another universalist component of the movement’s discourse is the proce-
duralist criticism of the government’s violation of democratic and consti-
tutional procedures and its arbitrary amendment of existing laws, as 
5  All translations from Serbian in the paper are mine.
366
MARJAN IVKOVIĆ SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND ENGAGEMENT...
members of the movement state that their aim is to make the processes of 
urban planning and realization of projects more transparent and subject 
to public debate. However, the movement also uses the language of con-
textualist critique as it questions the legality of the ‘Belgrade Waterfront’ 
project from the point of view of the existing legal framework in Serbia 
(which is being amended by the government to legalize the project). Finally, 
some of the activists also engage in societal diagnosis as they analyze the 
planning and the initial stages of the project’s realization not only in terms 
of the authoritarian behavior of the government but as forms of structural 
social domination embedded in the broader socio-economic transformation 
of Serbia into a peripheral capitalist state6.
Below are some examples of the three varieties (vocabularies) of social 
critique and their partial entwinement that can be found in the analytical 
bulletin Ne da(vi)mo Beograd! [We Won’t Let Belgrade D(r)own!] that the 
movement issued in March 2015.
Universalism
The following statements in the bulletin illustrate the proceduralist aspect 
of the movement’s universalism centred around the critique of the Serbian 
government’s authoritarian behavior in relation to the project ‘Belgrade 
Waterfront’:
‘Our desire is to arise the citizens’ interest in the development of their 
environment; to contribute to the processes and procedures related to the 
project ‘Belgrade Waterfront’ becoming more transparent; to insist on the 
establishing of new institutions and procedures and the functioning of 
the existing ones whose aim is to involve citizens in a dialogue about their 
living environment and the protection of the public interest, and not 
(only) that of investors’ (Ne da(vi)mo Beograd! 2015a).
‘The government of Serbia has declared the photographs of a model of 
‘Belgrade Waterfront’ – two million square meters of residential/com-
mercial spaces that a friend of Serbia, Mohammed Al Abar, intends to 
build and rent – a “project of national significance”(!?)’ (Ne da(vi)mo 
Beograd! 2015b).
‘Such elimination of the institutions7 that have launched and were respon-
sible for one of the (proclaimed) largest projects in recent Serbian history 
6  It should be stressed that the ‘diagnostic’ type of discourse within the movement 
which inclines towards (various types of) neo-Marxism is limited to some members of 
the movement. The movement is ideologically heterogenous, its members ranging from 
classical and left liberals to (a minority of) radical leftists. 
7  The institutions the text refers to include the abolished Serbian National Agency 
for Spatial Planning and the General Plan of Belgrade (often referred to as the ‘Urban 
Development Constitution’ of Belgrade) which was amended in April 2014.
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gives us reason to doubt the seriousness of the project and the competence 
of its authors and perpetrators’ (Ne da(vi)mo Beograd! 2015c).
The statement below, on the other hand, demonstrates the movement’s 
commitment to a universalist theory of justice (egalitarianism) which questions 
the very institutional system of today’s Serbia (as it calls for the creation 
of a ‘new social architecture’):
‘The treatment of housing as an investment option prevents an ever 
greater number of people from leading a dignified life. To change this 
situation we must collectively create a new social architecture that will 
treat housing as a basic common good, and not as basis for enrichment’ 
(Ne da(vi)mo Beograd! 2015d).
Contextualism
In its critique of the government’s arbitrary exercise of power, the move-
ment also relies to some extent on the existing legal framework in Serbia 
and points to the violation of specific laws and regulations. For example, 
in relation to an unexpected inspection of private homes in Karađorđeva 
Street in Belgrade by representatives of the Agency for Urban Development 
Land, the movement invokes the existing Serbian Law on Expropriation:
‘Maybe they were impatient in the City Administration (after all, their 
wings are carrying us toward the realization of a project of national sig-
nificance), but the Law on Expropriation is explicit in ensuring that such 
preparatory actions may only be carried out after obtaining a license from 
the Ministry of Finance’ (Ne da(vi)mo Beograd! 2015e).
In relation to the controversial building of the promotional object ‘Sava 
Nova’ on the river bank, the movement once again relies on the existing 
regulations:
‘The real user is not the state enterprise “Belgrade Waterfront Ltd” but a 
private user – although all types of transmission of the right to use the 
temporary object are expressly prohibited by existing regulations. The 
private user would have to be selected in an official competition process 
for setting up a temporary facility’ (Ne da(vi)mo Beograd! 2015f).
And below we see an instance of a successful interweaving of universalist 
and contextualist components of the movement’s discourse:
‘The project of (proclaimed but never demonstrated) national importance 
is characterized by non-transparent processes, potentially huge risks and 
the evasion and distortion of legal and legislative mechanisms. Existing 
documents related to planning are expressly deregulated and adopted 
contrary to the law, in a non-democratic procedure in which the partici-
pation of citizens is reduced to nothing more than a formality’ (Ne da(vi)
mo Beograd! 2015a).
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Diagnosis
A crucial aspect of the ‘We Won’t let Belgrade D(r)own’ initiative (even if 
it is limited to some members only) is an attempt to analyze and critique 
the ‘Belgrade Waterfront’ project beyond the charge of the government’s 
authoritarianism, through situating the project in the broader context of 
the Serbian socio-economic transition to peripheral capitalism:
‘And so, while we stare at the sky, doubting that the city on water will 
ever become reality, money from the budget is disappearing under our 
very noses…’ (Ne da(vi)mo Beograd! 2015g)
‘The purpose of these mega-projects is not to contribute to the competi-
tiveness of cities but to give more power to political elites. These are 
politically orchestrated spectacles. The modus operandi of these ‘Dubaisa-
tions’ is always the same: it starts with an aggressive marketing campaign 
and the ceremonial opening of the model, with the politicians and investors 
photographed next to it’ (Ne da(vi)mo Beograd! 2015h)
A particularly acute diagnostic passage:
‘The remnants of the state housing funds are destroyed in a planned man-
ner and the land on which they are built is sold for a pittance. All of that 
goes hand in hand with brutal austerity measures of centralized Euro-
pean institutions that affect the poorest strata most acutely. All elements 
of the housing infrastructure such as the existing apartments, public and 
municipal land and rent prices are pushed onto the international speculative 
market’ (Ne da(vi)mo Beograd! 2015d).
And below is an instance of a successful interweaving of universalist vo-
cabulary with that of diagnosis:
‘Modification of plans, and even laws, in the interest of individuals or 
certain groups indicates a disorganized state and the ignoring of the 
public interest and citizens. In the end, the individual profits and the city 
bears the risks’ (Ne da(vi)mo Beograd! 2015i).
Conclusion: a productive tension
As the above examples demonstrate, the ‘politicization’ of a phenomenon 
such as a megalomaniacal urban renewal project – the persuasion of the 
public that a certain issue is not merely a matter of ‘development’ and 
‘progress’, or that it is not merely of concern to a small group of actors – 
requires a simultaneous battle on three different fronts of justification. It 
requires the interweaving of the three vocabularies of critique in a compre-
hensive or ‘holistic’ type of collective social engagement exemplified by the 
‘We Won’t let Belgrade D(r)own’ initiative. If the initiative’s members only 
employed the vocabulary of abstract normative universalism (the universalist 
principle of egalitarianism and the proceduralist insistence on participation 
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and transparency), they could easily be criticized from a ‘contextualist’ 
perspective as ‘utopians’, as people who reject completely the existing (by 
definition imperfect) legal/institutional system in Serbia. If they only relied 
on the existing legal regulations (or rather their violation) as standards of 
critique, they would lose the grounds of critique once the government ar-
bitrarily changed these regulations. Finally, if they only used a ‘diagnostic’ 
vocabulary of causal explanation (e.g. the Marxist-inspired explanation of 
the project as driven by the logic of capital) they would be vulnerable to 
the charge of ‘epistemological authoritarianism’. Why should their fellow 
citizens who do not endorse the broader vision of the social reality that 
underpins the causal explanation (diagnosis) endorse their critique?
On the other hand, the interweaving of the three vocabularies of critique 
produces a certain tension in the engaged actors’ discourse, and the above 
examples and brief analyses of selected statements offer some insight in 
this respect. Since the movement uses the universalist language of egali-
tarianism to criticize the country’s legal system as a framework in which a 
particular unjust phenomenon occurs but also invokes the existing laws of 
that order (which do not live up to the demanding universalist standard of 
egalitarianism) to criticize their violation in the relevant context, one can 
identify a particular ‘universalist-contextualist’ tension between the two 
vocabularies of critique.
The movement’s universalist language that focuses on the importance of 
procedures also sits somewhat uneasily with the activists’ diagnosis of the 
‘Belgrade Waterfront’ project as part of the ‘neoliberalization’ of Serbia, since 
the citizens who disagree with the broader social-theoretical premises of 
this diagnosis are under no obligation to accept it (we thus see a ‘universal-
ist-diagnostic’ tension arise). Finally, the contextualist focus on the govern-
ment’s violation of existing laws and regulations is somewhat difficult to 
square both with the universalist conception of justice that the movement 
endorses (consider the activists’ notion of a ‘new social architecture’ in 
contrast to their reliance on the existing Law on Expropriation) and with 
the language of diagnosis. In the left-leaning diagnostic perspective that 
exists within the movement, the current legal framework should appear as 
a product of the twenty five years of Serbia’s socio-economic transition to 
peripheral capitalism, and is thus part of the problem rather than solution.
However, the two above examples that could be seen as instances of a ‘suc-
cessful interweaving’ of different vocabularies within one critical statement 
(the examples of the fusion of universalism and contextualism and of uni-
versalism and diagnosis) indicate that collective social engagement might 
be somewhat more successful in maintaining the ‘productive tension’ be-
tween the three imperatives of justification than the theoretical ‘holistic’ 
critique such as Habermas’ or Honneth’s. This, I would argue, is due to the 
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fact that, unlike theoretical critiques which often merely aspire to an ‘in-
trinsic relation to practice’ (e.g. the tradition of critical theory), forms of 
collective social engagement such as the ‘We Won’t Let Belgrade D(r)own’ 
movement really have such an intrinsic connection. Their logic could be 
seen as ‘inductive’ in the sense that the elaboration of critique starts from 
an experience of injustice related to a concrete societal phenomenon and 
then ‘generalizes’ it through complex attempts at transforming this phe-
nomenon into a political issue. The normative statements that the engaged 
actors articulate in all three vocabularies of critique can at all times be 
traced back to this primary impetus of ‘politicization’. They are ‘intrinsi-
cally’ related to practice in the sense that they serve the emancipatory 
purpose of politicization, and this is what makes their internal tension 
inherently ‘productive’. Theoretical perspectives such as Habermas’ and 
Honneth’s, on the other hand, follow the ‘deductive’ logic of applying 
purely theoretically justified criteria of critique to concrete empirical phe-
nomena, so that the tension between the three imperatives arises before, 
and independently of, the societal phenomena that are criticized, and is 
not characterized by an ‘inherent’ productivity of politicization. In this 
sense, collective social engagement can to some extent serve as a model 
for holistic social critique articulated within the confines of theory.
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Marjan Ivković
Društvena kritika i angažman između univerzalizma, 
anti-autoritarnosti i dijagnoze društvene dominacije
Apstrakt
U ra du se raz ma tra spe ci fič na ,,izo mor fi ja” ko ja se mo že uoči ti iz me đu dve for me 
dru štve ne kri ti ke: ‘ho li stič ke’ te o rij ske kri ti ke ko ju pred sta vlja ju auto ri po put 
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Jir ge na Ha ber ma sa i Ak se la Ho ne ta i ‘ko lek tiv nog dru štve nog an ga žma na’ ko ji 
pred sta vlja ju po kre ti po put ‘Ne da(vi)mo Be o grad’ u da na šnjoj Sr bi ji, a ko je rad 
na sto ji da raz gra ni či od kon ven ci o nal ni jih for mi gra đan skog pro te sta. Ova izo-
mor fi ja, ka ko rad na sto ji da po ka že, ogle da se u ten zi ji iz me đu tri im pe ra ti va 
oprav da nja kri ti ke – im pe ra ti va nor ma tiv nog uni ver za li zma, epi ste mo lo ške an ti-
auto ri tar no sti i di jag no ze dru štve ne do mi na ci je – ko ja na sta je usled po ku ša ja 
‘ho li stič kih’ te o rij skih kri ti ča ra i ko lek tiv nog an ga žo va nih ak te ra da isto vre me no 
od go vo re na zah te ve sva tri im pe ra ti va. Na kon pred sta vlja nja tri vr ste te o rij ske 
dru štve ne kri ti ke ko je se kri sta li zu ju oko sva kog od im pe ra ti va, rad naj pre raz-
ma tra ten zi ju iz me đu sva tri im pe ra ti va u for mi u ko joj se ja vlja kod ‘ho li stič kih’ 
te o rij skih kri ti ča ra Ha ber ma sa i Ho ne ta, a po tom iden ti fi ku je istu vr stu ten zi je u 
ini ci ja ti vi ‘Ne da(vi)mo Be o grad’. Ten zi ja unu tar dis kur sa ovog po kre ta osli ka na 
je kroz kra ću ana li zu bil te na Ne da(vi)mo Be o grad ko ji je po kret iz dao u mar tu 
2015. Po što ana li zi ra ni pri me ri uka zu ju da je ko lek tiv ni an ga žman uspe šni ji od 
te o rij ske kri ti ke u odr ža va nju po me nu te ten zi je ,,pro duk tiv nom”, rad na po slet ku 
na krat ko raz ma tra mo gu će uzro ke ove raz li ke.
Ključ ne re či: izo mor fi ja, ten zi ja, kri ti ka, oprav da nje, an ga žman, uni ver za li zam, 
kon tek stu a li zam, di jag no za, Sr bi ja
